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Questions of Priority
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and Construction Loan Mortgagees
NORMAN T. SMITH AND CHARLES M. COBBE*
Laborers, suppliers, subcontractors, or contractors who have con-
tributed materials or labor to a construction project and have not been
paid for those contributions commonly file mechanics' liens against
the property on which the construction has taken place. At the same
time, however, the identical difficulties that have prevented payment to
the laborers, suppliers, and others usually induce the lender, which
has extended a construction loan to the owner of the premises, to
foreclose on its mortgage. The proceeds of sale are generally not
enough to satisfy both the mechanics' liens and the debt secured by
the mortgage, whether or not the project is ultimately completed before
it is sold. Thus, it must be determined in each case which of these
two types of claims will be given priority.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wayne Building & Loan
Co. v. Yarborough and the subsequently enacted Open-End Mortgage
Act2 have answered many of the questions that arise in this situation;
however, they have also left a number of important issues unresolved.
Among these are the continuing role of earlier statutes enacted with
reference to mechanics' liens; the nature of the requirements that a
mortgagee must meet in order to ensure that its mortgage will retain
priority over mechanics' liens; and the priorities that should govern
when a mortgagee, despite some default by its borrower, continues its
disbursements in order to preserve and, perhaps, complete the im-
provements on the mortgaged property. This article will deal with
these issues, primarily with regard to Ohio law. It will also consider
the preliminary question of what rationale best supports the system of
priorities that has evolved in Ohio, and it will offer some conclusions
regarding a matter closely related to the operation of this system of
priorities: the doctrine of negligent disbursement of construction loan
proceeds by lenders.
I. OHIO'S SYSTEM OF PRIORITIES
An early Ohio statute provided that a mortgage, once recorded,
conferred priority on the mortgagee over subsequent lienors.? How-
* Members, Ohio Bar. Mr. Smith is a member of and Mr. Cobbe is associated with the
firm of Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Columbus, Ohio.
1. 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841 (1967).
2. Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1970).
3. VoL 29, § 7, [1831] Ohio Laws 348 (current version at Onio REv. CODE ANs. § 5301.23
(Page 1970)).
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ever, when the General Assembly later created a statutory mechanics'
lien, it also established that the effective date of a mechanics' lien
for purposes of priority over other encumbrances was not the date the
lien was filed, but the date on which construction began on the
premises involved.4 This was true even if the person asserting a lien
did not contribute labor or materials until after the construction had
begun.5
This relation back of mechanics' liens did not affect a lender that
had recorded its mortgage and disbursed all loan proceeds before
construction had commenced. However, the courts hesitated to pro-
tect a lender that had recorded its mortgage before work had begun
but had disbursed the applicable loan fund only in stages corresponding
to stages in the completion of construction; although the lender was
compelled to follow this practice in order to ensure that the value of
its security increased along with the amounts it had paid out, the courts
were reluctant to find that the mortgagee's priority could attach at a
time when it had advanced far less than the total amount of loan
proceeds available.6 This problem was partially resolved by Kuhn v,
Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co.,7 in which the court held that a
mortgagee's priority dated from the filing of its mortgage, even when
the loan proceeds were advanced in stages, if the mortgagee had
obligated itself to pay out the full amount of the loan proceeds. The
court in Kuhn found that the mortgagee should not be subordinated to
a subsequent encumbrance when it was powerless to withhold its
advances after such an encumbrance arose." This protection for
mortgagees obligated to make future advances has now been estab-
lished in Ohio by the Open-End Mortgage Act.9
In addition to the doctrine of obligatory advances, there are other
statutory provisions that provide at least some degree of protection for
lenders. One such provision states that the owner of premises that
4. OHiO-REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.02 (Page 1962).
5. Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, II Ohio St. 2d 195 (1967) (syllabus 3).
6. See Jefferies, Yarborough Scrutinized: An Analysis of the Theoretical Foundations of
the Future Advance Mortgage, 30 Oino ST. L.J. 458, 464-65 (1969). Spader v. Lawler, 17
Ohio 371 (1848) has often been cited as an example of the court's reluctance to grant priority as
to advances made subsequent to the recording of a second mortgage.
7. 101 Ohio St. 34, 126 N.E. 820 (1920). The decision in Kuhn is consistent with the
view held by the courts of most other states in which the system of priorities has not bccn
altered by legislation. See Comment, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances: Problems of
Priority and the Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46 Miss. L.J. 433, 437-38 (1975).
8. A related question concerns the priority available to a mortgagee whose advances are
not obligatory. The jurisdictions have differed as to the type of notice which an intervening
encumbrancer must give the mortgagee in order to cut off the protection that the mortgagee
has obtained by recording its mortgage before the commencement of construction, See Note,
The Open-End Mortgage in Ohio, 25 CIN. L. REv. 82, 88 (1956); Jones, Mortgages Securing
Future Advances, 8 TEx. L. REv. 371, 374-77 (1930). OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page
1970) now provides that the intervening encumbrancer must provide actual notice of his lien
to the mortgagee in order to cut off the mortgagee's priority.
9. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1970).
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are being improved is not liable for more than the amount owed to
his principal contractor,' as long as the owner obtains statements of
amounts due and accordingly pays those amounts." By extension,
since no lien against the property may arise if these requirements
have been met, a mortgagee cannot be subordinated to a claim made
by a subcontractor, laborer, or supplier who has not been paid.12
However, these provisions apply only when a single principal contrac-
tor is involved. When a developer has undertaken to improve premises
that he owns and does not engage a single principal contractor, his
liability and that of his mortgagee can no longer be limited to the
amount due to one individual. 3 Hence, in the numerous cases involv-
ing real estate developers, the system of priorities between mortgagees
and mechanics' lienors remains extremely important.
A further possible source of protection for mortgagees is con-
tained in Ohio Revised Code § 1311.14. 4  This provision confers on
the mortgagee the authority to take certain measures to ensure that
payments from loan proceeds reach the subcontractors, laborers, and
others entitled to them. More importantly, § 1311.14 states that a
mortgagee, by referring to this authority to regulate payments in its
mortgage and following a complex order of disbursements of mortgage
funds, obtains priority over any mechanics' liens filed after the lender
records its mortgage.' 5  Section 1311.14 is designed to protect the
potential mortgagee that might be willing to initiate a loan after
construction has commenced, but that might be deterred from doing
so by the prospect that all mechanics' liens attaching to the project
will attain priority over its mortgage.
16
It is not entirely clear whether § 1311.14 also applies to a mortgage
recorded before the commencement of construction; however, the
better view is that a mortgagee that has complied with the require-
ments of § 1311.14 may invoke the protection of that provision regard-
less of the time when it records its instrument.17  In Wayne Building
10. Id. § 1311.05 (Page 1962).
11. Id. § 1311.04 (Page 1962).
12. See Magrish, Disbursement of Ohio Construction Mortgage Loans, 12 CiN. L REv.
1, 7-10 (1938).
13. See id.
14. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page 1962) (original version at Ohio Gen. Code
§ 8321-1, 106 Ohio Laws 531 (1915)).
15. The application of § 1311.14 is more fully discussed in Comment, Construction
Mortgages in Ohio, 29 OHio ST. LJ. 917, 926-40 (1968); Magrish, supra note 12, at 11-23
(discussing Gen. Code § 8321-1).
16. Comment, Construction Mortgages in Ohio, supra note 15, at 929; see also Rider v.
Crobaugh, 100 Ohio St. 88, 125 N.E. 130 (1919) (construing Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 8321-1
(Page 1938), current version at OIo , Ev. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page 1962)).
17. A number of authorities suggest that § 1311.14 applies only to mortgagees that make
loans and record their mortgages after construction has begun. In Rider v. Crobaugh, 100
Ohio St. 88, 99, 125 N.E. 130, 133 (1919), and Ulmer v. Portage Constr. & Fin. Co., 26
Ohio N.P. (ns.) 257, 280-81 (C.P. Summit County 1926), the courts reasoned that Ohio General
Code § 8321-1 (current version at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page 1962)) had been enacted
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
& Loan Co. v. Yarborought8 the court implicitly accepted this view,
in that it carefully considered the terms of § 1311.14 as well as the
doctrine of obligatory advances before it decided that the mortgagee
that had recorded its mortgage before the commencement of con-
struction was not entitled to full priority. The purpose and effect of
§ 1311.14 are to ensure that the proceeds of a mortgage loan are
applied to the improvement of the mortgaged premises and that sub-
contractors and others are paid for their labor and materials. 19  If
a major objective of the courts is to protect subcontractors and others
who have invested labor and materials in a construction project,2" this
objective is equally well achieved by compliance with § 1311.14. The
mortgagee that invokes this section and meets its requirements should
therefore be protected.
A question likely to occur more often is whether a mortgagee
that has mentioned § 1311.14 in its mortgage instrument is required to
comply with that section in order to retain priority. The courts have
generally agreed that there is no such requirement, and that a mort-
gagee that has mentioned § 1311.14 nevertheless remains free to
invoke the obligatory advance doctrine.21 However, this holds true
only where the language of the mortgage merely authorizes the mort-
gagee to disburse proceeds in accordance with § 1311.14. Where the
mortgage clearly requires the mortgagee to disburse the loan funds in
accordance with that section, as by stating that the loan proceeds
"shall be disbursed" in compliance with § 131L14, the lender may
not depart from the provisions of that section, even if the subsequent
disbursements might otherwise be protected by the doctrine of obliga-
tory advances.22
only because Ohio General Code § 8321 (current version at O111o Rrv. CoDL ANN. § 1311.13
(Page 1962)), in providing that any mechanics' lien arising from a construction projicct took
effect as of the date when the first work was done on the project, necessitated greater prote-
tion for mortgagees that made loans after construction had commenced. Another court in
In re Williams, 252 F. 924, 930 (N.D. Ohio 1918), pointed out that the order which § 8321-1
establishes for the disbursement of loan proceeds reflects the assumption that construction
has begun, and that some mechanics' liens have attached, before the recording of the mortgage
which is to be protected. None of these cases directly involved the question whether a mort-
gagee that filed its documents before the commencement of construction could voluntarllv
invoke the protection of that section, although a dictum in li re Williams suggests that
voluntary use of the statute is possible. 252 F. at 930. In both Rider v. Crobaugh, stpra.
and In re Williams, supra, the courts were concerned with whether a mortgagee was required
to comply with § 8321-1 in order to retain priority, even though the mortgagee had recorded
its mortgage before the commencement of construction. In Ulmer v. Portage Constr. &k Fin,
Co., supra, the issue was whether § 8321-1 created a trust fund for the unpaid claimants.
18. 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 219, 228 N.E.2d 841, 857 (1967). See Akron Say. & Loan
Co. v. Ronson Homes, Inc., 15 Ohio St. 2d 6, 238 N.E.2d 760 (1968), in which the court again
found it necessary to determine whether the mortgagee had complied with § 1311.14, although
the mortgage had been recorded before the commencement of construction.
19. Knollman Lumber Co. v. Hillenbrand, 64 Ohio App. 549, 555, 29 N.E.2d 61, 63
(Hamilton County 1940).
20. See section II infra.
21. In re Taylor, 20 F.2d 8, 9-10 (6th Cir. 1927); A.G. Slarp Lumber Co. v. Manus
Homes, Inc., 90 Ohio L. Abs. 421, 423, 189 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ct. App. Mahoning County 1961).
22. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Bldg. Co., 61 Ohio L. Abs, 477, 486-87, 101
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Although a lender incurs few risks by referring to § 1311.14 in
its mortgage document, reference to this section is of little value as a
practical matter. Most mortgagees that refer to the section undoubt-
edly do so with the expectation of relying principally on the doctrine
of obligatory advances; they intend to fall back on § 1311.14 only in
the event that some later occurrence should render remaining ad-
vances optional, thus depriving them of the protection of the obliga-
tory advance doctrine.23 However, even under these circumstances,
compliance with § 1311.14 is cumbersome, and it is unlikely that, if
its provisions are followed, laborers and suppliers will long continue
to contribute their services in view of the delays which § 1311.14
imposes on payments to them.24  More importantly, a lender that
seeks to comply with this section must begin by discharging any
mechanics' liens that have already attached to the premises.25 Pay-
ments for this purpose are extremely undesirable to a lender, for the
reasons suggested by the following example: A mortgagee agrees to
lend forty thousand dollars to a developer to finance improvements
expected to cost that amount. After the mortgagee has disbursed
twenty thousand dollars in reliance on the doctrine of obligatory dis-
bursements, it becomes apparent that, although the value of the
premises has been increased to the extent of twenty thousand dollars,
certain subcontractors and others have not been paid because, by
reason of the developer's inefficiency or dishonesty, the funds disbursed
have not been sufficient to pay for all the improvements actually made.
In order to retain its priority under § 1311.14 the lender must now
discharge the mechanics' liens that inevitably have resulted from the
developer's shortage of funds. Let it be supposed that the amount of
N.E.2d 408, 413-14 (C.P. Hamilton County 1950). See also Note, Ohio Lien Priority Rules
Affecting Mortgages, Mechanics' Liens, and Fixture Security Interests. 18 W. REs. L REV.
1284, 1297 (1967).
23. The authors of one article have concluded that this might not be acceptable to the
courts, reasoning that § 1311.14 would be construed to provide no protection unless all dis-
bursements, including those made earlier in reliance on the obligatory advance doctrine,
had been made in accordance with that section. Ramey & Jefferies, Construction Mortgage
Financing in Ohio, 3 AKRON L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1969). However, the courts would probably not
take such a rigid view. The first step in complying with the section is to satisfy all existing
encumbrances or to set aside funds for that purpose. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.14(A)
(Page 1962). If this is done, those subcontractors and others who have participated in the
project during its early stages and then filed mechanics' liens cannot be prejudiced by the
lender's original failure to comply with § 1311.14. Of course, those laborers and suppliers
who have failed to file mechanics' liens may remain unpaid, as the mortgagee's obligation
to compensate them is subordinate to other obligations imposed by the section. See note 24
infra. However, one suspects that most laborers and others generally protect themselves by
filing mechanics' liens.
24. See Magrish, supra note 12, at 10-23. As pointed out in In re Williams, 252 F. 924,
929 (N.D. Ohio 1918), the mortgagee's obligation to pay amounts due to laborers and suppliers
at the time the loan is made is subordinate to its obligation to withhold sufficient funds to
complete the improvements. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.14(B), (D) (Page 1962). As
the Williams court also points out, the mortgagee is likely to experience difficulty in retaining
suppliers and laborers if the mortgage funds are insufficient for both of the obligations just
mentioned. Id.
25. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.14(A) (Page 1962).
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such liens is four thousand dollars. The mortgagee's next obligation
is to set aside sufficient funds to complete the project-here twenty
thousand dollars-and to use these funds in completing the improve-
ments. 26  If it does so, it will upon completion of the project have
paid out forty-four thousand dollars to complete improvements worth
forty thousand dollars. Moreover, the repeated reference in § 1311.14
to the terms of the mortgage would probably indicate to a court that
the mortgagee's interest in the property extends only to the amount
stated on the mortgage. 27  Thus, the mortgagee is unsecured as to
four thousand dollars of its investment. Although the mortgagee has,
in principle, discharged all liens that attached before it began to rely
on § 1311.14, and although that section protects it against any me-
chanics' liens filed after it has begun to rely on § 1311.14, the statute
offers no protection against judgment liens and, perhaps, other en-
cumbrances that may attach after disbursements have begun in ac-
cordance with the statute. The mortgagee could avoid this prob-
lem by obtaining a new mortgage at the time it begins to rely on
§ 1311.14; this mortgage could state an amount sufficient to discharge
prior encumbrances and complete the improvements. However, in
order to retain its priority the mortgagee would still be required to
discharge all prior encumbrances, including any judgment liens, al-
though such liens might have no relation to any improvement in the
property.28
Since these latter two statutory measures for the protection of
mortgagees are of limited usefulness, most lenders are well advised to
rely instead on the doctrine of obligatory disbursement to protect
their priority.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
OBLIGATORY DISBURSEMENT
The rationale originally advanced for the greater protection ac-
corded mortgagees that had made their advances pursuant to an obliga-
tion was that a mortgage ordinarily could not come into existence
until a debt had first been created. Therefore, no mortgage could be
found to exist, and no priority assured a mortgagee, until advances
26. Id. § 1311.14(B), (C).
27. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1970), which codifies the obligatory advance
doctrine, requires the mortgagee to state the total amount whih may be secured by the
mortgage.
28. To be sure, the latter difficult, is also faced by mortgagees that extend loans in con-
nection with projects already in progress but in which they have bad no prior interest. How-
ever, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page 1962) provides a period, at the outset of the trans-
action, during which the prospective mortgagee may withdraw from the project if it discovers
unacceptable encumbrances. This period is of little use to a mortgagee that is already in-




had been made pursuant to the mortgage agreement.29 However, it
was deemed consistent with this reasoning to hold that a mortgage
came into existence immediately upon the execution of the instrument
and of the agreement to repay if the mortgagee bound itself to make
advances in the future. The reason for this view was that the mort-
gagee's unequivocal promise to make future advances was, from the
mortgagor's standpoint, an adequate assurance that the proceeds of the
loan would be made available; thus the mortgagor immediately re-
ceived the equivalent of full disbursement of the loan proceeds. Be-
cause there was both a present benefit to the mortgagor and a promise
to repay it, the debt, the mortgage, and the mortgagee's priority came
into existence at the outset.30
The critics of this highly conceptual view have argued that any
mortgage should be held to arise immediately upon the initial dis-
bursement.31 Even when advances are optional, most construction
loans include an immediate disbursement by the lender to permit
construction to begin. This disbursement constitutes sufficient con-
sideration to sustain a mortgage and its underlying indebtedness.
Hence, there is no doctrinal reason why priority cannot relate back to
the time of execution of the mortgage.3 2
A more pragmatic rationale for the obligatory advance doctrine
is based on the operation of the recording system. It is argued that a
recorded mortgage that refers to an obligation of the lender to advance
the full amount stated therein provides adequate notice to prospective
encumbrancers of the extent of the lender's ultimate claim on the
premises.33 In contrast, when a mortgagee agrees to make advances
only at its option, it is impossible for subsequent encumbrancers to
know what portion of the value of the mortgaged premises will be
claimed by the mortgagee in the event of default.
34
However, this reasoning is circular. It could as well be postulated
that a mortgagee is entitled to priority as to the full amount shown on
the face of the mortgage, or whatever lesser amount is in fact advanced,
regardless of any distinction between obligatory and optional ad-
vances. An encumbrancer would then assume that he would be sub-
ordinated to the extent of the face amount of the prior mortgage, and
29. Spader v. Lawler, 17 Ohio 371, 379-80 (1848).
30. Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 216, 228 N.E.2d 841,
855-56 (1967); Kuhn v. Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Ohio St. 34, 38, 126 N.E. 820, 821
(1920).
31. ag., G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 114, 117 (2d ed. 1970).
32. Id.
33. See Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 216-17, 228 N.E. 2d
841, 855-56 (1967).
34. Id. See also Kuhn v. Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co., 101 Ohio St. 34, 36-37, 126
N.E. 820, 821 (1920).
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he would not be prejudiced upon finding that the mortgagee's priority
did not extend to this full amount.3
An additional difficulty with basing the rules of priority on the
operation of the recording system is that it is often not clear from
recorded instruments whether advances in particular cases are obliga-
tory. The Ohio Supreme Court has twice declined to decide whether
mortgagees are required to refer in their recorded instruments to their
obligations to make future advances,36 and the Open-End Mortgage
Act3 7 does not resolve this question. Even if a mortgagee makes such
a reference in its mortgage, it is permitted to impose certain types of
conditions on its obligations;38 and it would be of questionable wisdom
to require a subsequent encumbrancer to decide whether to perform
work or extend credit on the basis of its conclusion whether the con-
ditions in a prior mortgage were so extensive as to vitiate the mort-
gagee's obligation to make advances.
A different rationale is that the doctrine of obligatory advances
protects the owner against restrictions on the alienability of his
property. It is argued that the lender's obligation to make all stated
future advances compensates the mortgagor for the possibility that
the future-advance mortgagee may abrogate the security of a subse-
quent owner or encumbrancer by making additional advances follow-
ing a sale or second mortgage. This possibility must necessarily
make the property less marketable. However, the weakness of this
argument is that a later purchaser or mortgagee is easily able to avert
the danger of subsequent advances by obtaining a release or cancella-
tion of that encumbrance or a covenant that no further advances will
be made by the mortgagee. 40  Such a covenant should be easily ob-
tained since the borrower will in most cases have no immediate need
of financing by a new lender if the first mortgagee is willing to remain
involved in the transaction and advance the entire amount stated in
the loan agreement.
The best rationale for the doctrine of obligatory advances is that
it protects potential mechanics' lienors against arbitrary conduct by
construction loan mortgagees. While purchasers and mortgagees are
35. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 31, § 116.
36. Akron Say. & Loan Co. v. Ronson Homes. Inc., 15 Ohio St. 2d 6, 13. 238 NXI2d
760, 765 (1968), Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough. I1 Ohio St. 2d 195. 220, 228 N.132d
841. 858 (1967).
37. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1970).
38. Id. § 5301.232(E)(4) (Page 1970).
39. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 31, § 117a. See also Blackburn. MAnrgages to Secure
Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. REv. 209, 211-12 (1956).
40. See Comment, Mechanics' Liens: The "Stop Notice" Comes to Washington, 49 WAt, u
L. REv. 685, 693 (1974). Ohio's Open-End Mortgage Act, Onto ltYv Coot AN . § 5301.232(C)
(Page 1970), permits a mortgagor to limit its indebtedness under a future-advance mortgage




able to protect themselves against subsequent advances, many con-
tractors, laborers, and suppliers are less aware of releases, subordina-
tion agreements, and other devices that might be used for their protec-
tion. Hence, they require greater protection against the danger that a
mortgagee may, long after the execution of the mortgage, lend addi-
tional amounts that are not used to increase the value of the property
which mechanics' lienors may reach. The effect of this abuse is that
the mortgagee thereby increases its share of the proceeds of sale of
the property at the expense of mechanics' lienors.
The courts have shown strong hostility to this conduct on the
part of mortgagees in cases not involving mechanics' liens. It has
been held that a mortgage that purported to secure all debts, present
or future, did not secure a loan extended two years after the mortgage
for a purpose other than the purchase or improvement of the mortgaged
property.1 More generally, the courts have held that a mortgage
securing one debt does not secure a later obligation if the two obliga-
tions are not of the same character.42 In the context of construction
loans, the doctrine of obligatory advances provides a rough method
for restricting the types of indebtedness to which particular mortgages
may apply. A mortgagee is necessarily reluctant to incur an obliga-
tion to pay out money in the distant future for purposes other than
construction because the mortgagor's reliability may by then have
deteriorated; yet, if the mortgagee retains only the option of making
such advances, an intervening mechanics' lienor is not threatened with
loss of his priority. Furthermore, the doctrine of obligatory advances
relieves the courts of making the sometimes difficult determination of
whether a given advance is so closely related in purpose to prior ad-
vances that it may share the priority of these advances.
The courts' distinction between obligatory and optional ad-
vances also performs a secondary function. It provides a degree of
protection for subcontractors, suppliers, and laborers against mort-
gagees that may unjustifiably cease making advances before construc-
tion is complete and before the entire stated amount of the mortgage
proceeds has been disbursed. Although instances of this are probably
not common, it is possible to imagine a case in which a lender dis-
covers that the ultimate value of the premises being improved will be
less than anticipated and, therefore, insufficient to enable the developer
to repay its loan. The lender would be inclined to respond to this
41. Second Nat'l Bank v. Boyle, 155 Ohio St. 482, 99 N.E.2d 474 (1951). Spader v.
Lawler, 17 Ohio 371 (1848), although often cited as an outright rejection of future-advance
mortgages, is closely similar to Boyle. In Spader, the mortgagee asserted that his interest
secured a loan made several years after the original loan had been paid in full.
42. Eg., National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 1959). qtfd sub nom.
National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960). See also Note, Refine-
ments in Additional Advance Financing: 7he "Open-End" Mortgage, 38 MINN. L REv. 507,
511-15 (1954).
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situation by cutting off its advances and relying on its position as
mortgagee to enable it to recover the amounts so far disbursed. The
danger from such conduct is that, at any time during construction,
there are likely to be subcontractors and others who have supplied
labor and materials but have not yet been compensated. Since they
have expected to be paid from the next advance made by the mort-
gagee, they may not have filed mechanics' liens.43 Although they are,
of course, able to file liens when it becomes apparent that they will
not be paid, the value of real estate during construction is often in-
sufficient to compensate both the mortgagee and the mechanics' lienors.
The doctrine of obligatory advances can therefore serve to force
mortgage lenders to incur part of the risk that the improvement of
the mortgaged premises may prove to be a poor investment.
One writer has suggested that the doctrine of obligatory advances
is, at best, a primitive means for protecting any parties involved in
construction because mortgagees know that their agreement to lend
money will not be specifically enforced and that damages for breach
44
of their agreement are likely to be only nominal. However, an
aggrieved mortgagor would be entitled to recover damages for refusal
to lend money as agreed in those cases in which the interest rate
had risen because of market conditions and not merely because the
mortgagor's reliability had deteriorated.45 In addition, it is easy to
envision a large construction project that can be supported only by a
group of lenders; if one of these lenders should withdraw its support
for reasons not directly related to the mortgagor's performance, such
as a -dispute among the lenders or exhaustion of the resources of one
of the lenders, the mortgagor may encounter serious difficulty in locat-
ing new sources of funds. During the time needed to arrange for
new financing, the mortgagor might be confronted with lost rental
income, deterioration of the partially completed premises, and wors-
ened relations with laborers, subcontractors, suppliers, and prospective
tenants or purchasers of the mortgaged premises. To a lesser extent
these same problems would arise even in the case of a smaller project
involving a single lender. At the same time, mortgagees are further
deterred from arbitrarily cutting off disbursements by the probable
repercussions of such conduct on their reputations among potential
customers.
43. The case of such subcontractors, laborers, and others is different from those who have
already filed mechanics' liens, in that the previous filing of mechnics' liens and the mortgagor's
failure to discharge them justifies the lender in cutting off further advances. Discharge of all
liens is undoubtedly one of the conditions that a mortgagee may impose on its obligation to
continue disbursement of the loan proceeds. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.232(E)(4)
(Page 1970).
44. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.4 (1965).
45. See Skipworth, Should Construction Lenders Lose Out on Voluntary Advances If a Loan
Turns Sour?, 5 REAL ESTATE L.J. 221, 228 (1977).
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The conclusion that the function of the doctrine of obligatory
advances is primarily to protect actual or potential mechanics' lienors
6
will be helpful in considering two other problems relating to future
advances: the necessary content of the mortgage document, and the
priority to be accorded the mortgagee that continues to make dis-
bursements despite a breach of the conditions of the loan agreement.
III. NEGLIGENT DISBURSEMENT OF LOAN PROCEEDS
The issue of negligent disbursement arises when disbursed pro-
ceeds of a mortgage loan do not reach the subcontractors and others
who are entitled to payment. In this situation mortgagors and unpaid
subcontractors may argue that the mortgagee was under a duty to en-
sure that the proceeds of its loan would be paid to them rather than di-
verted by an inefficient or dishonest contractor. However, the majority
rule is that a mortgagee is not liable to subcontractors and others
under this theory unless the mortgagee has actively contributed to the
failure to pay subcontractors, has represented to the subcontractors
and others that they would be paid, or has acted with actual knowledge
that the proceeds of its loan were not reaching those entitled to be
paid. These propositions provide a way to reconcile the two Ohio
cases decided on this issue.47 They are also helpful in determining
what conditions a mortgagee may impose on its obligations, as well as
the extent of the priority available to a mortgagee that continues its
disbursements after breach of these conditions.
A clear case for holding a mortgagee subject to mechanics' liens
or liable to a mortgagor occurs when the mortgagee itself diverts
mortgage loan proceeds toward other uses than those contemplated
in the loan agreement. A number of courts have held lenders liable
to their mortgagors in such situations; the net effect of these cases
on mortgagees is the same as that of granting priority to the claim of
mechanics' lienors to the proceeds of sale of the mortgaged premises.
In a Minnesota case a mortgagee was held liable to its borrower after
the mortgagee had applied the proceeds of its loan to offset debts
owed to it by the borrower's contractor but unrelated to the project
being financed.48  Similarly, a mortgagee that has agreed to finance
46. It is also interesting to note that the obligatory advance doctrine is enforced not by
the mortgagors but by the mechanics' lienors who may be able to use the doctrine to alter the
priorities in their own favor. - See Akron Say. & Loan Co. v. Ronson Homes, Inc., 15 Ohio St.
2d 6, 238 N.E.2d 760 (1968), in which the mortgagees failure to make one disbursement until
three months after the requisite voucher and warranty were presented influenced the court in
concluding that the mortgagee's advances were not obligatory and, therefore, not entitled to
priority over the lien of a supplier.
47. Gardner Plumbing, Inc. v. Cottrill, 44 Ohio St. 2d 111, 338 N.E.2d 757 (1975); Falls
Lumber Co. v. Heman, 114 Ohio App. 262, 181 N.E.2d 713 (Summit County 1961). See text
accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
48. MSM Corp. v. Knutson Co., 283 Minn. 527, 167 N.W.2d 66 (1969). ait see D'Aubin
v. Mauroner-Craddock, Inc., 262 La. 350, 263 So. 2d 317 (1972).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
construction projects owned by several different developers may be
held liable to a mortgagor if it disburses funds from that mortgagor's
account for work on projects that he does not own.' 9 In imposing
liability on a mortgagee in one such case, the court pointed out that
the mortgagee was in the best position to prevent misapplication of
the loan funds, as it could have required proof that the construction
on the mortgaged property had progressed and that the funds advanced
were used to meet costs of the construction; without taking such
measures, the mortgagee could not reasonably have relied on the
mortgaged property as security for the amounts that it had dis-
bursed.50
Although there is little direct authority on the question, it would
also be proper to hold a mortgagee liable when it had continued to
disburse the proceeds of its loan with actual knowledge that these
amounts were being misappropriated by a contractor.5 1 In such a case
the mortgagee would be in the best position to prevent further mis-
appropriation of the funds, and should bear the cost of its failure to do
SO.
Another line of decisions has imposed liability on mortgagees
that have, either expressly or by their conduct, undertaken duties
beyond the fundamental duty to refrain from knowingly misapplying
loan proceeds. Thus, where a construction contract provided that the
mortgagee would inspect the premises before disbursing the install-
ments of loan proceeds, the court held the mortgagee liable for the
amounts of mechanics' liens for the charges unpaid by the defalcating
contractor.5 2  Although the mortgagee had made the required inspec-
tions, it disbursed two-thirds of the loan proceeds before the project
was more than one-third complete. In another case the mortgagee
had assumed full control of the disbursement process, insisting on
paying the loan proceeds directly to the suppliers and subcontractors
rather than to the mortgagor; this led the court to conclude that the
mortgagee was under the same duty to pay the suppliers and sub-
contractors as the mortgagor would have been, and, therefore, that it
lost its priority over the mechanics' lienor who was not fully paid.5
49. See Fikes v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251 (Alas. 1975). The plaintiff
in this case was not a mortgagor but a vendee possessing an equitable interest in the property.
The vendee's position was similar to that of a mortgagor, in that it sought to avoid paying tle
full contract price for property that had not benefitted from the application of the entire amount
of mortgage funds.
50. Id. A similar result was reached in Cambridge Acceptance Corp. v. Hoekstein. 102
N.J. Super. 435, 246 A.2d 138 (App. Div. 1968).
51. See Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409. 413,
424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967) (Crockett, J., concurring).
52. Speights v. Arkansas Say. & Loan Ass'n. 239 Ark. 587. 393 S.W.2d 228 (1965), It
should be noted that in this case an officer of the mortgagee was engaged in fraudulent conduct,
53. Fulmer Bldg. Supplies, Inc., v. Martin, 251 S.C. 353, 162 S.E.2d 541 (1968). Other
circumstances in this case, although not expressly taken into account by the court, probably
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Nevertheless, there are many situations in which the mortgag-
ee's words and conduct will not cause its interest to be subordinated.
In asserting their priority over mortgagees, mechanics' lienors have
maintained that, in bidding on a project, they have relied on the avail-
ability of mortgage loan proceeds; hence, they argue, the mortgagee
is estopped from refusing to pay the amounts due to these lienors
5 4
This argument is not well founded. Subcontractors, suppliers, and
laborers are not generally among those entitled to assert an estoppel
against the mortgagee if the reliance was due to statements by con-
tractors or mortgagors regarding the availability of loan proceeds;
a mortgagee cannot be estopped by the statements of a third person
unless that third person is the mortgagee's agent.55 Alternatively,
a mechanic's lienor asserting his own priority may argue that he has
relied on the statement of the maximum amount of loan proceeds that
is contained in the recorded mortgage document. In this situation
the lienor has arguably relied not upon an assertion by a person
unrelated to the mortgagee, but upon a statement by the mortgagee
itself. The weakness of this argument is that a party generally may
not assert an estoppel unless he is in privity with the person who made
56the statement. It is true that an exception to this rule applies when
the party to be estopped intends his statements to reach the general
public and induce the public to act;57 however, a person cannot be
bound by his statement unless he intended that it be relied on by the
person ultimately asserting the estoppel.58 A mortgagee that records
an instrument intends to perfect its claim to a particular portion of
the value of the mortgaged premises rather than to assure any poten-
tial creditors that a stated amount of money will be available to them
and should consequently not be bound.
The courts of a number of jurisdictions have refused to hold the
mortgagee liable in other contexts where the mortgagee has neither
diverted the loan funds to an account unrelated to the mortgaged
premises nor made direct representations to the claimant.59 In one
contributed to its conclusion; in particular, the mortgagee disbursed part of the contested
amounts to accounts that it knew were not related to the mortgage in question.
54. In Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644.48 Cal. Rptr. 278
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965), involving an asserted equitable lien on the proceeds of sale of the mort-
gaged property, the court sustained this argument.
55. See Lefcoe & Schaffer, Construction Lending and the Equitable Lien. 40 So. CAL.
L. REv. 439, 443-44 (1967).
56. Lubric Oil Co. v. Drawe, 26 Ohio App. 478, 160 N.E. 93 (Cuyahoga County 1927).
57. Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 67 Ohio App. 123, 36 N.E.2d 144 (Mahoning County
1940), afl'd, 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202 (1941).
58. Morgan v. Spangler, 14 Ohio St. 102 (1862).
59. Although this proposition is supported by the authorities subsequently discussed in
the text, the courts are not unanimous in so limiting the liability of mortgagees. In Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard Appliance Co., 247 Miss. 211, 150 So. 2d 416 (1963), the court found
that the mortgagee had violated its duty to potential mechanics' lienors in that its loan officer.
who inspected the mortgaged premises, did not obtain affidavits or other evidence of payment to
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such decision a mortgagee had paid the loan proceeds directly to the
owner without undertaking to satisfy any unpaid charges; the mort-
gagee's lien was held not subject to the loss of its priority over me-
chanics' liens. 60 Another court has concluded that a mortgagee does
not become the trustee of suppliers and subcontractors merely be-
cause it retains possession of the funds to be disbursed. 61  A third
has stated that a mortgagee's duty to suppliers and subcontractors is
negated by the absence of any contractual relation between the mort-
gagee and these claimants.62 It has also been determined that the
mortgagee will not be held liable for the malfeasance of a contractor
unless that contractor is the agent of the mortgagee. However, no
court has ever held that a contractor is the agent of a mortgage
lender.63
The preceding discussion makes it possible to harmonize the two
major Ohio decisions on the issue of improper disbursement. In
Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman64 a mortgagee had undertaken to disburse
loan proceeds directly to the principal contractor, expressly assuring
the mortgagors that it would protect them from any claims in excess
of the agreed price of their house. In making its disbursements,
however, the mortgagee failed to obtain the waivers that would have
protected the borrowers under the Ohio statute. 65  The court held
that in making such assurances the mortgagee had assumed the
duties of an agent of the borrowers and was consequently liable to
them for disbursing funds without obtaining the necessary waivers.
subcontractors before ordering further disbursements. Although the mortgagee by inspecting,
the premises impliedly undertook to disburse loan funds only as the construction progressed,
under the majority rule it is doubtful that its conduct imposed on it a duty to take the additional
step of obtaining vouchers. Cases similar to Pollard are Darien v. Hudson. 134 Colo. 213, 302
P.2d 519 (1956), and Wortman & Mann, Inc. v. Frierson Bldg. Supply Co., 184 So. 2d 857
(Miss. 1966). The courts of Louisiana appear also to have imposed a strict standard on
mortgage lenders, although, in the reported cases, lenders have met these standards and so have
escaped liability. See Meza v. Fidelity Homestead Ass'n, 271 Se. 2d 879 (Ct. of App. 1973);
Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank & Trust Co., 187 So. 2d 784 (Ct. of App. 1966), The Ohio
Supreme Court has clearly refused to follow the rule stated in Pollard and the other cases
mentioned above. See Gardner Plumbing, Inc. v. Cottrill, 44 Ohio St. 2d 111, 338 N.E.2d
757 (1975).
60. Potwin State Bank v. J.B. Houston & Son Lumber Co., 183 Kan. 475, 327 P.2d 1091
(1958). The court in Potwin distinguished an earlier case, WichLta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n.
v. Jones, 155 Kan. 821, 130 P.2d 556 (1942), in which the mortgagee had, in response to a direct
inquiry, informed certain suppliers of the amount of loan proceeds available.
61. General Mortgage Corp. v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 143, 138 N.W.2d 416 (1965).
62. Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wetterling Constr. & Realty, Inc., 302 Minn, 83,
223 N.W. 2d 418 (1974).
63. Cf Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447
P.2d 609 (1968) (lender not liable as a joint venturer with a contractor, despite the lender's
extensive involvement in planning a housing development). But cf. Speights v. Arkansas
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 239 Ark. 587, 393 S.W.2d 228 (1965) (mortgagee liable for fraudulent
conduct of its employee).
64. 114 Ohio App. 262, 181 N.E.2d 713 (Summit County 1961),
65. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.04 (Page 1962).
QUESTIONS OF PRIORITY
In a more recent case, Gardner Plumbing, Inc. v. Cottrill,66 the court
held that a mortgagee was not liable to its borrowers merely because
it had disbursed funds without obtaining the waivers that would have
67protected the borrowers. The court reasoned that under the terms
of the statute the mortgagee was not required to obtain such waivers;
it also determined that the evidence at trial had not demonstrated a
fiduciary relationship between the lender and the mortgagors.68 The
majority opinion in Cottrill contains no reference to the decision in
Falls Lumber. This indicates that the earlier decision has not been
overruled, and that the Ohio Supreme Court has adhered to the rule
that mortgagees are liable only when they have engaged in a narrow
range of conduct.
Compelling reasons of policy support the rule followed in Cot-
trill. While the equities in foreclosure cases generally favor the
mechanic's lienor, who has increased the value of the security of a
prior mortgagee, and so created a potential windfall,69 these equities
are not present in cases of construction loans and should not be invoked
to bolster the position that a mortgagee owes the mechanics' lienor a
broad duty of diligence. A mortgagee that extends a construction
loan necessarily contributes heavily to the mortgaged project and
relies on the new improvements to provide adequate security.70 A
second reason for restricting the liability of mortgagees is that sub-
contractors are commonly in as good a position as mortgagees to
prevent losses that may be caused by inefficient or dishonest con-
tractors. Even small subcontractors and suppliers are often able to
judge the solvency and reliability of individual contractors through
informal exchanges of information.71 Moreover, subcontractors and
suppliers occasionally assume part of the risk of default by the con-
66. 44 Ohio St2d 111, 338 N.E.2d 757 (1975).
67. Again, the waivers were those specified in OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.04 (Page
1962).
68. The lender's statements regarding periodic inspection of the premises were held to
have been merely a disclosure of measures designed for the lender's own protection and not an
offer to take special steps to protect the borrowers. The fact that the lender made disburse-
ments to the borrowers rather than to the contractor undoubtedly reinforced the court's con-
.clusion that the lender had undertaken no special duties.
69. The argument of unjust enrichment to the mortgagee was apparently relied on by the
court in McBain v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1966), a case involving an equitable lien. However, this case was persuasively
criticized in Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 55, at 443-44. With a few exceptions, e.g., Mclain
and Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n., 238 Cal. App. 2d 644,48 Cal Rptr. 278 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965), the courts in equitable lien cases generally follow the rule adhered to in
Cottrill. See, e.g., G. L. Wilson Bldg. Co. v. Leatherwood, 268 F. Supp. 609 (W.D.N.C. 1967)
(equitable lien granted where mortgagee assured claimant that full payment would be made);
United States v. Chester Heights Assoc., 406 F. Supp. 600 (D.S.C. 1975) (no equitable lien
granted where mortgagee and claimant were not in privity).
70. General Mortgage Co. v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 143, 153, 138 N.W.2d 416,421 (1965).
71. First Nat'l State Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102 NJ. Super. 300, 246 A.2d 22
(Ch. 1968), aff'd, 107 N.J. Super. 389, 258 A.2d 545 (1969). See also Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra
note 55, at 442, 447-48.
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tractor by colluding with contractors or mortgagors in executing false
vouchers of payment.72 Even where the work that the vouchers
represent has been completed, this practice seriously impedes the
construction lender that seeks to detect and prevent cost overruns as
early as possible. A final consideration of policy is that subcontrac-
tors and suppliers customarily rely, not on any commitment of a
mortgage lender to ensure payment of all those involved in a con-
struction project, but instead on the general credit of the contractor
with whom they are in direct privity." For all these reasons the
courts should, and generally do, hesitate to impose extensive liability
on mortgagees merely because these represent an easily accessible
"deep pocket."
IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE MORTGAGE
AND LOAN AGREEMENT
The preceding discussion has set forth a rationale for the doctrine
of obligatory advances and, with reference to the issue of negligent
disbursement, has suggested how the risks attendant on any con-
struction project should be allocated between the mortgagee and the
potential mechanics' lienors. With this discussion in mind, the require-
ments that a mortgagee must meet in order to ensure that its future
advances are obligatory and therefore entitled to priority will now be
considered.
A. Including Future Obligations in the Mortgage Document
An initial question is whether the language which makes future
advances obligatory must be included in the recorded mortgage docu-
ment. In Wayne Building & Loan Co. v. Yarborough74 the court
suggested that the "better practice 75 would be for mortgagees to
refer in their mortgages to their obligations to make future advances.
The basis for this statement appears to be the court's fear that me-
chanics' lienors will be unexpectedly deprived of priority, after they
have already contributed to a construction project, by a subsequent
determination that the mortgagee's advances were obligatory. It
would be foolish for a mortgagee to ignore such a clear warning by
the court; however, if a mortgagee that has somehow omitted this
reference in the recorded instrument is forced to defend its priority
against intervening lienors, the priority of its mortgage is supported
by the weight of authority and by the fact that, in practice, potential
72. Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 55, at 447.
73. First Nat'l Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 300, 246 A.2d 22 (Ch, 1968),
74. 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841 (1967).
75. Id. at 220, 228 N.E.2d at 858.
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mechanics' lienors are rarely influenced by the contents of recorded
mortgages.
Despite the above cited dictum in Yarborough, the Ohio courts
have never held that mortgagees must refer in their mortgages to their
obligations to make future advances. In Akron Savings & Loan Co.
v. Ronson Homes, Inc. 76 the Ohio Supreme Court, although repeating
the warning of Yarborough, declined to hold even that an oral commit-
ment to advance loan funds is necessarily ineffective to secure priority.
Instead of holding outright that the oral agreement was without effect
because intervening lienors could learn of it only with great difficulty,
the court carefully examined all the evidence, including the alleged
oral agreement, before determining that the future advances were not
obligatory. The plain implication is that mortgagees will not be
deprived of priority merely because reference to their obligations is
omitted from their recorded documents.
Nothing in the recent codification of the doctrine of obligatory
advances77 changes this conclusion. Although the statute sets forth
in some detail the types of information which must be included in
the recorded documents, it contains no requirement that the mort-
gagee include a statement of its obligation to advance loan proceeds.
In view of the uncertainty created as to this question in Yarborough,
it may be inferred that had the legislature deemed such statements
to be necessary, it would expressly have provided for them.
The majority view is that mortgagees need not refer in recorded
documents to their obligations to make future advances. This is based
on the operation of most states' recording systems. A mortgagee
generally is not permitted to adduce parol evidence of the terms of
a mortgage if the rights of third persons would thereby be prejudiced, 78
and mechanics' lienors are arguably within this class of "third per-
sons." However, it is also true that a recorded mortgage constitutes
notice of those facts that would be revealed by an investigation
based on information contained in the mortgage. 79 There can be little
question that the statements in the mortgage of the maximum amount
of the loan proceeds and of the fact that it secures future advances,
together with the knowledge by potential mechanics' lienors that the
mortgagor intends to erect a building, are sufficient to put the potential
lienor on inquiry notice of whether the mortgagee is obligated to
make the advances in question.
This reasoning has led the courts of numerous states to hold di-
rectly that a mortgagee's priority is not destroyed by its failure to
76. 15 Ohio St. 2d 6, 238 N.E.2d 760 (1968).
77. The Open-End Mortgage Act, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1970).
78. See, e.g., Langerman v. Puritan Dining Room Co., 21 CaL App. 637. 132 P. 617 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1913).
79. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 262 (1949).
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mention in its recorded documents its obligation to make future ad-
vances.80 Several courts have concluded that a potential encum-
brancer who knows the total amount to be secured by a mortgage
normally assumes that the earlier mortgagee will have priority to the
full extent of that amount; hence, such an encumbrancer is not
prejudiced by his discovery that the future advances are in fact
obligatory and, therefore, the mortgagee retains full priority.8' It is
consistent with this reasoning to hold, as one court has done, that a
party challenging a mortgagee bears the burden of pleading that the
mortgagee's disbursements are optional. If this assertion is not in-
cluded in the pleadings, and if the mortgage document does not show
on its face that the mortgagee's disbursements are optional, it is ap-
propriate to hold that the disbursements are obligatory and that the
mortgagee is entitled to full priority.
8 2
It may be an unstated premise in these decisions that suppliers,
subcontractors, and others, even if they find no mention of the mort-
gagee's obligation in the recorded document, do not rely on the pos-
sibility that they may obtain priority over a mortgagee if the latter's
advances are not obligatory. Instead, such lienors benefit from any
obligation on a mortgagee to advance the full stated amount of loan
proceeds, whether or not this obligation is mentioned in a recorded
document. Rather than arguing that they have been led to assume
that their liens have priority over the mortgage, mechanics' lienors
are likely to assert that they have relied on the mortgagee to dis-
burse the full amount stated in the recorded mortgage.83 These two
arguments are not consistent, and the courts have evidently determined
that mechanics' lienors will not be permitted to stand on both sides
of the issue.
B. Terms and Conditions of the Obligation in the Agreement
Although a mortgagee need not fear loss of priority merely be-
cause it has failed to mention its obligation in a recorded document,
it nevertheless faces the danger that the language in the agreement
on which it relies to confer priority will not be found sufficiently bind-
ing to create the necessary obligation. 4 It is not enough that the
80. See Lumber & Builders Supply Co. v. Ritz, 134 Cal. App. 607, 25 P.2d 1002 (Dist,
Ct. App. 1933); Jefferies, supra note 6, at 474.
81. E.g., Good v. Woodruff, 208 Il. App. 147 (Dist. Ct. App. 1917); Blackmar v. Sharp,
23 R.I. 412, 50 A. 852 (1901).
82. See Rochester Lumber Co. v. Dygert, 136 Misc. 242, 240 N.Y.S. 580 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1930).
83. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
84. It has been asserted that most agreements governing residential construction loans
in Ohio do not contain language sufficiently binding to confer priority on mortgage lenders.
Lucas, Construction Mortgage v. Mechanic's Lien-The Struggl? for Priority, BAR BRiuLS,
Sept. 20, 1968, at 7 (publication of Columbus, Ohio Bar Association).
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mortgagee be merely "authorized" to make future advances in a
certain manner, the words "obligated" or "required," or their equiva-
lent, must appear in the statement of the mortgagee's commitment in
order for the mortgage or loan agreement to confer priority.85 The
loan agreement or mortgage must state the amount which the mort-
gagee is obligated to disburse, 86 and it must specify the manner in
which disbursement is to take place.87  The last named requirement
does not refer to escrow accounts, assignments of funds, or other ad-
ministrative details; however, the loan agreement or mortgage must
indicate, when this is the case, that the funds will be advanced as
various stages of construction are reached and must specify any con-
ditions that the mortgagee has imposed on its obligation to extend
future advances. A statement that a mortgage is given "to pay for
improvements" is not sufficient. 88 Also insufficient are provisions that
the lender will disburse funds only on the mortgagor's written order
and presentment of vouchers, or that the lender will conduct inspections
and surveys.8 9
Reference to the procedure for disbursement set forth in Ohio
Revised Code § 1311.14 does not confer priority unless the mortgagee
carefully follows this procedure. It is true that in Kuhn v. Southern
Ohio Loan & Trust Co.9° the court held that a reference to this statute
was sufficient indication of the parties' intent that the future advances
be obligatory. However, Kuhn has been so narrowly distinguished
that it is now of little value as authority on this question.9t
Ohio's Open-End Mortgage Act permits mortgagees to impose
conditions on their obligations to make future advances without
losing priority as to these advances.92 However, this provision should
not be taken to mean that any condition conceived by mortgagees is
necessarily acceptable, since some conditions would obviously vitiate
the mortgagee's purported obligation to disburse loan proceeds. Be-
cause the statute gives no help in determining what conditions are
acceptable, it is necessary to consult the case law on this question.
The most common condition imposed by mortgagees is that dis-
85. Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 220, 228 N.E.2d 841,
858 (1967).
86. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1970). See Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v.
Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 220, 228 N.E.2d 841, 858 (1967). But see Lyman Lamb Co.
v. Union Bank, 237 Ark. 629, 374 S.W.2d 820 (1964).
87. Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 220, 228 N.E.2d 841,
858 (1967).
88. Akron Say. &,Loan Co. v. Ronson Homes, Inc., 15 Ohio St. 2d 6, 10,238 N.E.2d 760,
763 (1968).
89. Id at 11-13, 238 N.E.2d at 760, 763-64.
90. 101 Ohio St. 34, 126 N.E. 820 (1920). See generally Magrish, Disbursement of Ohio
Construction Mortgage Loans, 12 CIN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1938).
91. See Akron Say. & Loan Co. v. Ronson Homes, Inc., 15 Ohio St. 6, 238 N.E.2d 760
(1968).
92. Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.232(E)(4) (Page 1970).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:3
bursement of loan proceeds is to take place only in increments cor-
responding to stages in the completion of construction. The reason
for this is that lenders seek to ensure that the value of their security
remains commensurate with the amounts they have paid out. If a
loan agreement or mortgage states that the tender is in all other
respects obligated to disburse the loan proceeds, a provision for
disbursement in stages does not by itself defeat the lender's priority.9
However, if the stages at which disbursements are to be made are not
set forth with sufficient definiteness, there is substantial danger that
the advances will be found optional;94 courts will not infer from busi-
ness custom or the exigencies of mortgage loan transactions that the
lender is bound to continue its advances so that the amount disbursed
always approximates the value of the mortgaged premises. The ad-
vances will be deemed optional and the mortgagee will no longer be
entitled to full priority if a mortgage provides merely that funds shall
be advanced at times and in amounts to be determined by the mort-
gagee,9 s or if it appears that a mortgagee retains discretion as to
whether or not to make advances even after the corresponding stages
of construction have been reached.96
Decisions in other jurisdictions have allowed mortgagees sub-
stantial discretion over the times when disbursements are to be made,
provided only that mortgagees are not permitted to retain all loan
funds until construction is complete.97  However, mortgagees in Ohio
should not rely on these cases. The weight of authority, as indicated
above, is that more exact provisions must govern the times when
93. Geer v. Tuggle, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 129, 29 Ohio Dec. 552 (C.P. Clark County 1919).
There is ample support for this conclusion from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., House v. Long,
244 Ark. 718, 426 S.W.2d 814 (1968); Whelan v. Exchange Trust Co., 214 Mass. 121, 100 NE.
1095 (1913).
94. See Home Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Sullivan, 140 Okla. 300, 284 P. 30 (1929). An ex-
ample of the stages applicable to residential construction at which a lender becomes obligated
under its loan agreement to disburse successive installments of the mortgage proceeds is given
in Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 55, at 439 n.l:
1. foundation is laid and all rough lumber has been delivered to the site;
2. structure is roughed in and roofing is in place;
3. interior plastering and exterior finishing are complete;
4. cabinetry, flooring and interior painting have been commenced;
5. improvements are fully complete and certificates have been obtained from
the necessary authorities.
95. National Bank v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973). This de-
cision has been superseded by WAsH. REv. CODE § 60.04.220 (Supp. 1975); however, it re-
mains relevant to those states, such as Ohio, that have not enacted similar statutory provi-
sions.
96. Kingsberry Mortgage Co. v. Maddox, 13 Ohio Misc 98, 233 N.E.2d 887 (C.P.
Clermont County 1968).
97. E.g., Thompson v. Smith, 420 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1966). The court in this decision dis-
tinguished Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 140 Okla. 300, 284 P. 30 (1929), supra note
94, on the ground that the mortgagee in the earlier case could have withheld all disbursements
until construction was complete. However poorly this distinction comports with the realities
of construction lending, it is consistent with the opinion in E.K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulhol-
land, 118 Cal. App. 475, 5 P.2d 669 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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disbursements are to be made. Moreover, the burden on lenders to
specify the stages of construction is slight in comparison to the in-
creased protection that specific statements provide for suppliers, la-
borers, and subcontractors, who are thereby relieved of the need to
rely for long periods on the credit of the contractor.
In addition to making disbursements conditional on the comple-
tion of various stages of construction, mortgagees commonly attempt
to impose conditions relating to the quality of their borrowers' or the
contractors' performance. Examples of such conditions are: a require-
ment of an appraisal satisfactory to the mortgagee before the first
disbursements may be made; requirements that the borrower's archi-
tect be satisfactory to the lender, and that the architect supply satis-
factory progress reports before each disbursement; and a provision
that disbursements may be withheld unless the lender finds that
construction has been done in a workmanlike manner.98 It is easy
to imagine other conditions that a mortgagee might seek to impose:
a requirement that the borrower maintain bonds, comply with gov-
ernment regulations, and pay any debts that might result in mechanics'
liens; reservation by the lender of the power to stop disbursements if
cost overruns appear prohibitive; and a requirement that materials
used in construction will be of the quality called for by plans and
specifications.
Although one court has found certain of the above named condi-
tions to be unacceptable, 99 it is submitted that conditions of this kind
do not vitiate a lender's obligation, provided that the loan agreement
does not state simply that the times and amounts of disbursements
are left to the lender's discretion. This conclusion is in accord with
the law of contracts, under which conditions destroy the obligations
of the parties to an agreement only if one party's performance be-
comes dependent entirely on its own desire to perform.'0° The satis-
faction of a lender with the quality of materials or workmanship or
with other aspects of a construction project is a permissible condition
because a finder of fact can determine whether or not the lender was
in truth satisfied. 01 In determining whether a mortgagee's conditions
have been met, the finder of fact is permitted to consider whether a
reasonable person in the mortgagee's position would have been satis-
fied with the performance. 0 2 It may also apply other objective tests
98. These conditions were present in National Bank v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d
886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973). The court held that they destroyed the obligatory nature of the loan.
99. Id. It may be that these conditions would not have been fatal to the lender's priority
if they had not been coupled with a provision that disbursements would be made in amounts
and at times to be determined by the mortgagee; however, the express enumeration of these
conditions indicates that they may, by themselves, cause difficulty for lenders.
100. See 3A A. CoRBiN, CoNTRACrs § 644 (1960).
101. See id. §§ 644-45.
102. Enterprise Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Howard Inv. Corp., 105 Ohio App. 502,
152 N.E.2d 807 (Montgomery County 1957).
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when performance is mechanical and subject to measurable stan-
dards,10 3 as is often true of construction work. As a result, a mortgagor
can enforce its lender's commitment to make future advances, and the
courts should have no difficulty in finding that future advances are ob-
ligatory and, therefore, protected against competing liens, despite the
presence of these conditions.
A different problem is posed by conditions -that, unlike those dis-
cussed above, are not within the control of the mortgagor or its con-
tractors. An example is a provision that the mortgagee may cease to
make disbursements if it should appear during construction that the
soil or other subterranean conditions are unsuitable for the type of
construction in progress. Such a condition is objectionable not be-
cause it threatens to make the mortgagee's obligations illusory, but
rather because the possibility of unsatisfactory subterranean condi-
tions is not the kind of risk that should be imposed on suppliers,
laborers, and subcontractors. As the discussion of negligent disburse-
ment of loan funds has shown, 10 4 the majority of courts have con-
cluded that suppliers, subcontractors, and others in their position
must bear the risk of the dishonesty or inefficiency of mortgagors and
principal contractors. The reasons for this are that suppliers and sub-
contractors are capable of helping to avoid these problems, and that
they are expected to rely on the ability and integrity of mortgagors
and contractors more heavily than they rely on mortgagees. These
considerations do not apply to conditions based on subterranean prob-
lems. It is true that mortgagors may be expected to determine
whether subterranean conditions are adequate for any planned con-
struction and that subcontractors and others could obtain this informa-
tion from mortgagors; however, mortgagees, which are often large
institutional lenders, are more capable of demanding and utilizing
technical information and are in a much stronger position to prevent
a construction project from proceeding without assurance that sub-
terranean conditions are suitable.
Similar reasoning applies to conditions that are entirely aleatory,
such as a provision that disbursements will stop, with the mortgagee
retaining priority as to proceeds, if the site of construction is con-
demned by government authority. While it is appropriate to shift
to subcontractors and suppliers the risk that construction will be
halted for reasons that can be prevented or avoided by them, sub-
contractors and suppliers are virtually unable to anticipate in any given
instance that condemnation or some similar event will occur, and
clearly do not rely on contractors and mortgagors to prevent these
occurrences. For these reasons, suppliers, subcontractors, and other
103. See CORBIN, supra note 100, § 646.
104. See section III supra.
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potential mechanics' lienors should not be required to bear the risks
associated with conditions not fully within the control of mortgagors
or contractors.
V. PRIORITY As To DISBURSEMENTS MADE AFTER
CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN BROKEN
When a mortgagor defaults on its obligations, the mortgagee
may wish to continue to disburse funds since it is often justifiably
apprehensive that it cannot obtain a satisfactory price at a fore-
closure sale unless it makes additional expenditures to complete the
project.1 5 It is not practical for the mortgagee to foreclose on the
premises and purchase them at foreclosure sale before such time.
During the long pendency of the foreclosure action, the mortgagee
could incur substantial loss from deterioration of the premises and
wasted rental value. Alternatively, the mortgagee after commencing
a foreclosure action might ask the court to appoint a receiver. The
receiver could, upon application to the court, obtain the authority
to borrow funds (usually from the mortgagee) and issue receiver's
certificates as security therefor. The receiver's certificates would
enjoy priority superior to even the first mortgage. However, this
course of action carries with it substantial disadvantages, including
the expense of the receivership and the mortgagee's lack of control
over the receiver, since the receiver is accountable only to the court.
Additionally, there is the danger that a particular appointment will be
considered suspect if the trustee is determined to be too closely as-
sociated with the mortgagee. Unfortunately, objections to such ap-
pointments often do not arise until, by hindsight, a third party can
see how additional funds might have been generated by following a
different course of action.
At the same time, it is unwise for a mortgagee simply to con-
tinue to make the expenditures needed to complete a mortgaged
project without first commencing a foreclosure action. In all likeli-
hood the mortgagee has attempted to protect its original priority by
imposing conditions on its obligation to make future advances.10
Often, it is the breach of precisely these conditions which constitutes
the borrower's default. Many courts have held that a failure to per-
form any of these conditions releases the mortgagee from its obliga-
tion to continue its disbursements, and that any disbursements made
subsequent to default are optional and, therefore, not protected by the
mortgagee's original priority. 1 7  There are no reported Ohio deci-
105. See Kratovil & Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities Problem
-The "Unobligatory" Advance, 41 TENN. L. REv. 311, 313-16 (1974).
106. See id.
107. !-g., Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. Williams, 121 Cal. App. 571, 9 P.2d 324 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1932); Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wash. 2d 29, 116 P.2d 253 (1941).
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sions resolving this dilemma.08 When the issue does arise, the Ohio
courts should view the majority rule with skepticism and should take
into account both the significant economic reasons and the doctrinal
justifications for granting priority to mortgagees that make funds
available for completion of troubled construction projects.
Several decisions grounded on the rule that disbursements made
after a breach of conditions are not protected by the mortgagee's
original priority could better have been decided on the basis of other
doctrines. In a California case a party purchased a deed of trust,
thereby assuming the position of mortgagee, after the contested
mechanic's lien had attached. 10 9 Under the general rules of priority,
the court could have held that party's interest subordinate to the
mechanic's lien. Moreover, the purchaser of the trust deed had
affirmatively undertaken to ensure that all mechanics' liens existing at
the time it acquired its interest would be discharged, but had failed to
do so. Thus, the case is distinguishable on its facts from ordinary
cases involving disbursements following default.
Other cases, although also ostensibly decided on the grounds of
the majority rule on disbursements after default, similarly contain
special facts that detract from their value as authority for this rule,
In a Delaware case a mortgagee's agent fraudulently ordered pay-
ments to a contractor;" 0 this decision could easily have been based
instead on the doctrine of negligent disbursement. Another decision
involved a contest between a construction mortgagee and a purchase-
money mortgagee who had subordinated his interest to the extent
of only a stated portion of the total construction loan proceeds."'
Disbursements beyond this amount were held not protected under the
disbursement-after-default rule. However, the limited extent of the
108. In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Bldg. Co., 61 Ohio L. Abs. 477, 101N.E.2d 408 (C.P. Hamilton County 1950), the court determined that the mortgagee had bound
itself to disburse loan proceeds in accordance with Otio REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page
1962), and that, in failing to disburse in this manner, the mortgagee lost its priority. How-
ever, Birzer does not control the problem at hand, since the consequences of departure from
the statutory scheme are clearly established by the statute itself and not by any judicial rea-
soning concerning a mortgagor's failure to meet conditions.
109. Community Lumber Co. v. California Publ. Co., 215 Cal. 274, 10 P.2d 60 (1932).
In this case, the owner of property had executed a deed of trust to a construction contractor,
who then sold the trust deed to a third party after mechanics' liens had already attached, In
Community Lumber, as under Ohio law, all mechanics' liens attached as of the time construc-
tion commenced. See E.K. Wood Lumber Co. v. Mulholland, 118 Cal. App. 475, 5 P.2d 669(1931). Although the shelter doctrine might appear to protect the purchaser of the deed of
trust in this case, since the deed of trust had originally been executed before the commence-
ment of construction, the court found that the contractor, to whom the deed of trust had
first been granted, was the agent of the owner of the premises. Hence, the purchaser could not
argue that it had acquired its interest from a prior party that had obtained the deed of trust
before construction had commenced.
110. J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews Bldr., Inc., 287 A.2d 686 (Del.
Super. 1972), aff'd, 303 A.2d 648 (Del. 1973).
111. Althouse v. Provident Mutual Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 59 Cal. App. 31, 209 P. 1018
(Dist. Ct. App. 1922).
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subordination agreement would by itself have allowed the court to
protect the purchase-money mortgagee.
In contrast to the above cases, a decision which illustrates the
proper-and limited-application of the doctrine of obligatory advances
is Swaye v. Murphy, 12 where the mortgage agreement provided that
the final disbursement would be made only after a certificate of
occupancy had been issued. Because the mortgagee had made the
final disbursement before this condition had been met, the court held
that the mortgagee was not entitled to priority as to that disbursement.
The doctrine of negligent disbursement was not applicable in favor of
the mechanics' lienors because the mortgagee had never represented
to them that it would undertake special measures for their protection;
nevertheless, it was desirable to impose some sanction to ensure that
the mortgagee adhered to its own stated schedule of disbursements.
By failing to observe this schedule, the mortgagee eliminated a major
source of control over cost overruns on the construction and increased
the likelihood that the loan proceeds would be diverted to pay costs
unrelated to the construction project. For these reasons it was ap-
propriate to invoke the rule denying priority as to advances made
while conditions in the mortgage agreement remain unfulfilled.
The considerations that support the decision in Swaye v. Murphy
are not applicable to the more common cases in which a lender con-
tinues to make disbursements despite a default in one of the condi-
tions in the loan agreement. In Swaye the mortgagee itself was
responsible for the default since it removed all incentive for the con-
tractor to comply with the lender's conditions by prematurely disburs-
ing an installment of the loan proceeds. In contrast, the source of
default in an ordinary case lies entirely with the mortgagor or his con-
tractor, thus it is of little use to deprive the mortgagee of its priority
as a sanction for permitting cost overruns or other difficulties. More-
over, a mortgagee that assumes control of a project following a de-
fault thereby takes the most effective possible measure to prevent
further difficulties and becomes able to ensure that the remaining
funds will be properly applied. In addition, once a mortgagee has
assumed control, a court is free to reimpose the standards that the
mortgagee itself created in establishing conditions for disbursement.
Thus a court can, as in Swaye, deny priority as to any advances made
before the corresponding stages in construction have been reached;
and it can impose the same sanction as to all advances made following
the mortgagor's default should the mortgagee arbitrarily interrupt its
new series of disbursements. Similarly, a court can easily determine
from the original loan agreement and the specifications for construc-
tion the purposes for which the loan proceeds were intended to be
112. 126 Conn. 497, 12 A2d 547 (1940).
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paid out, and can deny the mortgagee's priority as to any amounts
which have been expended to enhance the value of the mortgagee's
priority beyond that which was originally envisioned.
Although the majority rule at least appears to deny the mort-
gagee's priority in these situations, there is strong support in some
decisions for a rule more favorable to lenders. This support is
evident in decisions involving a mortgagee's priority for amounts
advanced following default to pay taxes and expenses of maintenance;
in decisions applying the doctrine of negligent disbursement; and in
a number of other decisions bearing on the general question of dis-
bursements following default.
There is little question that a mortgagee, upon the mortgagor's
default, is entitled to pay insurance premiums, taxes, and costs of
maintenance in order to protect its security, and to include these
amounts in the debt secured by its mortgage.1 3 As a result, the
mortgagee may recover these expenditures from the proceeds of sale
upon foreclosure, and its claim to these amounts is superior to the
claim of the mortgagor to proceeds of the sale exceeding the face
amount of the mortgage.' 14  Moreover, as against intervening en-
cumbrancers, the mortgagee is entitled to the same priority in recover-
ing these expenditures as in recovering the amounts of disbursements
made before any intervening encumbrance arose. 15 In contests be-
tween mortgagees and other encumbrancers the courts have ignored
the doctrine of obligatory advances and stated merely that the
mortgagee's equitable right to protect its security prevails over the
rights of other encumbrancers, although these other rights may have
accrued before the mortgagee has made its contested payments."
6
As several writers have argued, 17 the rule applied to expendi-
tures for taxes, maintenance, and repairs should be extended to cases
where mortgagees have made expenditures needed to complete mort-
gaged improvements. It can further be argued that such expenditures
by the mortgagee generally do not diminish the value of mechanics'
liens which have attached to the property but, instead, that the in-
113. In Ohio this rule has been codified as OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.233 (Page 1970).
Although it is often not appropriate to reason by analogy from statutory provisions, this pro.
vision is declaratory of previous case law and, therefore, has some application to the issue of
disbursements following default.
114. Fletcher v. Bass River Say. Bank, 182 Mass. 5, 64 N.E. 207 (1902).
115. Hyde Park Say. & Loan Co. v. Cowles, Ill Ohio App. 343, 168 N.E.2d 602 (Hamilton
County 1960).
116. E.g., Mayo v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 103 N.J. Super. 227, 247 A.2d 33
(Ch. 1968). In this case, the mortgagee had disbursed part of the loan proceeds to discharge
mechanics' liens on the mortgaged property. The court held that, in so doing, the mortgagee
had violated no duty to an assignee of the mortgagor who asserted a claim to part of the
mortgage loan proceeds as payment for work completed under a contract with the mortgagor.
117. Eg. Kratovil & Werner, supra note 105; Comment, Mortgages to Secure Future




creased value of the premises as completed more than compensates
the mechanics' lienors for the increases in the amounts secured by
construction mortgages.
It is true that if the expenditures by a mortgagee following
default prove to be a poor investment and the value of the property
is not enhanced to the extent of increases in the mortgagee's claim,
the mechanics' lienors suffer. Courts have applied the rule denying
priority as to disbursements made following default in part to ensure
that mortgagees do not cast the risks of these investments onto
mechanics' lienors. However, it is possible to protect these persons
against such risks without depending on such an inflexible rule. In
cases involving expenditures for taxes, maintenance, and operation,
courts have permitted lenders to include in the amounts secured by
their mortgages, expenditures used to preserve and increase the value
of the mortgaged premises. In so doing, the mortgagee is required to
exercise good faith, and it may not add to its claim the costs of im-
provements that it has made in a merely speculative attempt to in-
crease the value of the mortgaged premises beyond the value that
these premises were understood to have when the mortgage was exe-
cuted.1 18 It also may not make improvements that are "merely
ornamental."1 9 A reading of the cases on this point suggests that
the courts' primary concern is to ensure that whatever expenditures
are made by the mortgagee, beyond essential payments for taxes,
maintenance, and operation, are conservative investments, unlikely
to increase the mortgagee's lien without increasing the value of the
property by an equal amount. To this end the courts are willing to
determine in each case whether expenditures by the mortgagee were
proper. They should be no less willing to do so in cases concerning
the relative priorities of mortgagees and mechanics' lienors. In
evaluating mortgagees' decisions on a case-by-case basis they would,
as suggested earlier, be considerably aided by the terms of applicable
loan agreements and building specifications. There would be little
danger of allowing a mortgagee to pay for more elaborate improve-
ments than those originally projected, while shifting to other lienors
the risks that such expenditures may not lead to a commensurate
increase in the value of the mortgaged premises.
A rule giving priority to mortgagees for reasonable expenditures
made after default would be consistent not only with the decisions
outlined above, allowing priority for amounts paid for taxes and
maintenance, but also with the majority of decisions on negligent
disbursement of loan proceeds. 12  As already indicated, the majority
118. Fletcher v. Bass River Say. Bank, 182 Mass. 5, 64 N.E. 207 (1902).
119. Bowen v. Boughner, 189 Ky. 107, 113, 224 S.W. 653, 656 (1920) (dictum).
120. See section III supra.
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of those decisions place on the mortgagee only the risk of those
losses which it has promised to prevent or which it has directly
caused by its own misconduct. Where losses are occasioned by dis-
honest or inefficient contractors or mortgagors, most courts have
declined to subordinate the claims of mortgagees. Cases involving
asserted negligent disbursement are similar in at least one major
respect to cases in which mortgagees seek to continue making ad-
vancements following default: in both situations, the issues revolve
around the failure of certain loan proceeds to reach their intended
recipients. It would be inconsistent for courts to limit the liability of
mortgagees, as they have done in cases of alleged negligent disburse-
ment, while expanding mortgagees' liability where no negligence is
asserted but where mortgagees have made additional expenditures to
protect and improve the premises that stand as security not only for
mortgagees, but also for holders of mechanics' liens.
Several courts have held directly that a mortgagee retains its
priority as to all advances made in order to complete the mortgaged
project after default. For example, one court has held that where, at
the time of execution of the mortgage and loan agreement, the intent
of the parties is clearly to confer priority on the mortgagee as to all
disbursements used to complete the improvements, this priority will
not be defeated by the combined operation of the filing of mechanics'
liens and the breach of one or more of the conditions contained in the
mortgage.121 Another court has held that a mortgagee retains its
priority unless its advances are, by the express terms of the mortgage,
"purely and plainly optional"; 22 the failure to meet conditions in the
mortgage does not, according to this court, have the same effect as
would such express language. An additional rationale put forth by
121. House of Carpets, Inc. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 85 N.M. 560, 514 P.2d 611 (1973).
The court relied on N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-5 (1953), which does not differ substantially from
the system of priorities that prevails in Ohio. A similar decision, but without the examina-
tion of intent found in House of Carpets, is Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood
Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967).
122. Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 54, 33 N.E. 735, 737 (1893). Under the rea-
soning of this case, the following language should be sufficient to confer priority as to all dis-
bursements following default, while giving the mortgagee discretion to cease disbursements if
justified:
Upon failure by the mortgagor to comply with any of the conditions set forth in this
mortgage, the mortgagee shall be relieved of all obligations imposed upon it by this
mortgagee. However, in the event of such failure by the mortgagor, the mortgagee shall
retain the power to make further payments for the purpos-. of protecting and com-
pleting the improvements on the mortgaged premises. Such payments shall be secured
by this mortgage, and the priority of the mortgagee's lien as to such payments shall
be the same as the priority of its lien as to those payments made by it in accordance
with this mortgage before any failure by the mortgagor to comply with the conditions
set forth in this mortgage.
This language obviously does not bind the mortgagee to make future advances; however, it
clearly expresses the intent of the parties as to the ultimate issue of priority, and leaves little




some courts in protecting the mortgagee's priority is that mechanics'
lienors are not parties to a loan agreement or mortgage, and are not
intended to benefit from the provisions of these documents. Hence,
they do not have standing to complain of any waiver of conditions
by the mortgagee.
123
A final reason for protecting the mortgagee, although not present
in all cases, is that mechanics' lienors have sometimes been parties
to the mortgagor's representations that the conditions for disbursement
have been met; as a result, they are estopped to assert that the mort-
gagee's conditions have been broken.124  This occurs when subcon-
tractors or suppliers execute vouchers falsely stating that certain
work has been completed in order that the contractor or mortgagor
may obtain funds to pay costs already incurred at a much earlier stage
of construction.
To all the foregoing arguments in favor of protecting the priority
of a mortgagee as to advances made even after default has occurred,
the objection most likely to be raised is the hardship that may fall on
mechanics' lienors as a result of protecting mortgagees. When heavy
cost overruns and a default by a contractor have occurred, leaving
certain subcontractors and others unpaid, it may appear inequitable
to permit the mortgagee to assume control of the construction, pro-
vide for full payment of all who have contributed to the project
following default, and then recover all or nearly all its investment
while the proceeds of sale of the premises are insufficient to com-
pensate those who contributed to the early stages of construction.
However, the priorities established by the Open-End Mortgage Act
lead to an equivalent result where a mortgagee, fearing the loss of
its priority, simply halts disbursement, forecloses on its mortgage, and
causes the premises to be sold, in all probability for an amount too
small to provide for full payment to mechanics' lienors. There is no
reason why the priority of these lienors should be improved merely
because the mortgagee has chosen instead to complete the construc-
tion, thereby saving itself, and ultimately the local economy, the costs
of deterioration and lost rental value. Rather than denying priority
outright to mortgagees in such cases, the courts should engage, in the
practical task of ensuring that mortgagees do not, at the risk of
mechanics' lienors, either arbitrarily cease disbursements or embark
on improvements not envisioned in the original loan agreement and
mortgage.
123. See Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador Holding Co., 171 Minn. 445,
214 N.W. 503 (1927); Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 33 N.E. 735 (1893). The Ambassador de-
cision involved other elements in addition to the mechanics' lienors' lack of standing- however,
the court clearly relied on this as one of the grounds for its decision.
124. See Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador Holding Co., 171 Minn. 445,
214 N.W. 503 (1927).
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Mortgagees that have agreed to disburse the proceeds of loans
in the course of construction on mortgaged premises are likely to find
that § 1311.14 and related statutory provisions are not only cumbersome
in application, but also inadequate to protect them against inter-
vening encumbrances. Therefore, they often invoke the protection that
the Open-End Mortgage Act' 25 confers on mortgagees that are under
an obligation to disburse the proceeds of their loans. In order to ob-
tain this protection mortgagees must make it clear either in their
mortgages or in their loan agreements that they are subject to an
obligation to disburse the loan proceeds. 126 However, this obligation
need not be stated in the mortgagee's recorded instruments. Further-
more, mortgagees may impose conditions on their obligations, but these
conditions may not pertain to matters not within the control of the
mortgagors or their contractors.
In general, when losses in construction are caused by dishonest
or inefficient mortgagors or contractors, these losses should not be
imposed on mortgagees. Where it is alleged that mortgagees have
negligently disbursed loan proceeds they should lose priority to the
mechanics' lienors only where the mortgagees themselves have mis-
allocated the proceeds of their loans or have expressly or impliedly
undertaken a special duty to their mortgagors or to potential me-
chanics' lienors. Where mechanics' lienors assert that mortgagees
have waived their priority by continuing to make disbursements despite
the default in the conditions imposed in loan agreements, mortgagees
should be subordinated to other claimants only in the uncommon
cases where the mortgagees' conduct has aggravated the danger that
contractors or mortgagors will not fulfill their obligations to potential
mechanics' lienors. Where mortgagees in these cases have not
contributed to the difficulties of construction projects and have con-
tinued disbursements as the most effective way to restrict losses to
all parties involved, they should not be penalized by subordination of
their interests to those of other parties.
125. OIO RE v. CODE ANN. § 5301.232 (Page 1970).
126. The mortgage must also be recorded prior to the commencement of construction,
See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
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